There is much debate about whether Hungary's Prime Minister Viktor Orbán poses a threat to the functioning of the European Union. After all, Orbán seizes almost every opportunity to confuse or offend his European partners – by temporarily blocking aid for Ukraine, organising far-right coalitions in the EU Parliament, and messing around in Moscow or Beijing. However, as long as he remains isolated in the circle of the 27 with his political disruptions, the risk of him causing the European engine to stutter is manageable.

Nevertheless, the risk of the EU losing its ability to act has rarely been as great as it is at the moment. This is less due to Hungary than to the founding countries. As a reminder, in 1958, six countries came together to form what is now known as the EU. In two of them, namely Luxembourg and Germany, political forces in favour of further European integration still dominate today. In the other four, however, the mood has changed – parties that are at least sceptical, if not hostile, to European integration have recently scored points here. In the Netherlands, the party of right-wing extremist Geert Wilders, who has repeatedly called for a Nexit, has been elected as the strongest parliamentary group. In Belgium, the Eurosceptics of N-VA and Vlaams Belang have taken the top two positions in the parliamentary elections. Italy's Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni has so far surprised her EU partners in the Council rather favourably when she has taken a common position on issues such as aid for Ukraine or migration. However, this does not change the fact that Meloni's Fratelli d'Italia party sees itself as a Eurosceptic force that wants far more rights for national reservations and special paths in the sense of a „Europe of the peoples“.

In France, finally, the feared march of the far right has failed to materialise. This explains the great relief with which individual MEPs or national heads of government reacted to the result of the second round of voting. At the same time, however, the victory of the left-wing bloc has raised concerns that France will cease to be Europe's flywheel for the foreseeable future.

It is still far too early to predict how France will organise itself politically after the elections – let alone what exactly this will mean for the EU. What is already clear, however, is that the process of political agreement and legislation in the EU will be different. More difficult. Slower. Firstly, because there are more people at the table who are no longer prepared to make concessions in order to facilitate European solutions. Secondly, the most important driving force behind European unification – the Franco-German tandem – will no longer be available in future. At least no longer in the form in which the tandem has worked to date. No matter who becomes prime minister in Paris in the future, he will be reined in by the left in his European policy ambitions and, at the same time, will have to ensure that he does not provide Marine Le Pen with additional fodder for the 2027 presidential election. This speaks against grand visions for Europe and a close alliance with Berlin on politically far-reaching issues.

The argument that it is not a bad thing for the EU to finally work with the handbrake on should be treated with caution: Watch out! After all, a limited ability to act does not mean that the EU is developing less regulation. It just means that it cannot react quickly and effectively when it is needed – in the pandemic, in the energy crisis or during the financial crisis.

Nevertheless, the hope remains that new formats will now emerge that will provide the necessary impetus in critical situations. It is, therefore, no coincidence that diplomats in Brussels are looking forward to the first half of 2025 when the pro-European Polish government will take over from Orbán in the Council.