In just a few weeks, the opinion of many ECB governors changed. Instead of a pause in interest rates, as hinted at in September, the central bankers announced a further easing of monetary policy on 17 October. The ECB's frequently emphasised dependence on data cannot really have been the only trigger for the central bank's change of heart. After all, nothing dramatic had happened with the economic data.

Certainly, the fall in inflation in the eurozone to 1.7% in September, and thus below the ECB's target, looks spectacular at first glance. However, economists and the central bankers themselves do not expect this to remain the case in the long term. Inflation is likely to pick up again from November at the latest. Moreover, the extent of the decline in September differs only slightly from the ECB's current projections. The inflation data is therefore no good as a justification for a faster pace of interest rate cuts.

A look at the latest economic indicators is more convincing. These suggest that the ECB may still be too optimistic about growth this year, despite revising its forecasts several times. In any case, the much-vaunted imminent upturn in private consumption due to real wage gains has yet to materialise. Industry is also unlikely to provide any major impetus for growth in the near future. This is indicated, among other things, by the latest surveys of purchasing managers, which economists regard as a good early indicator of economic growth. However, here too, the data has not actually deviated so much from expectations that the ECB would need to implement a different monetary policy course.

Perhaps the Fed has contributed to the rethink. The US Federal Reserve's 18 September interest rate cut of 50 basis points instead of an expected 25 was actually the most surprising economic news in the past few months.

The Fed's monetary policy in itself should not be a reason for the ECB to change its strategy. However, the actions of the world's most important central bank naturally have an impact on the economic and inflation data in the eurozone, which the ECB uses to steer its monetary policy. If the ECB had paused interest rates after the Fed had eased by 50 basis points, this would have led to an appreciation of the euro. This would have been an additional burden for the already weakening and export-orientated euro area industry.

However, something else is more relevant. The risks associated with the 17 October interest rate cut are very low for the ECB. Even after this step, monetary policy remains restrictive. In this context, an easing is justifiable in view of the progress made on disinflation and the weak economy. Especially as the ECB can decide against an interest rate cut in December, which the financial markets have firmly priced in, if the data does not develop as desired by then. The deposit rate would then be at the same level at the end of the year as it would have been if the ECB had cut rates in December after a pause in October.

However, this gives the ECB the option of exiting the restrictive monetary policy more quickly if necessary. For example, in the event of even worse economic development. This would have required a big interest rate move, something central bankers should be cautious about doing, given the psychological impact alone.

Caution should also be the key word for future monetary policy. After all, there are numerous upside risks for inflation. Punitive tariffs in the event of a Donald Trump election victory, the effects of the Chinese economic stimulus package, a further escalation in the Middle East, or wage development, could increase inflationary pressure. However, even after the mid-October interest rate cut, the ECB does not necessarily have to abandon its restrictive monetary policy in the near future.