The day after the agreement on future debt rules in Europe, one might think that the negotiators had done everything right. After all, all sides are equally dissatisfied. There is loud criticism from those who wanted more control over national budgets. On the other hand, there have been harsh complaints from those who want room for manoeuvre for investments even in financially challenging times.

Of course, there are points that can be criticised in the finance ministers' agreement. It contains a number of exemption clauses that allow governments to incur more debt than agreed, as well as soft wording that makes it easier for governments to fend off deficit procedures. It confirms the strong role of the EU Commission in budgetary control, even if many have long since lost confidence in the EU authority as the guardian of budgetary rules.

However, those who are bitterly disappointed with the result must be accused of political naivety. That France or Italy would have agreed to a reform of the budget rules that would almost automatically lead to Paris or Rome having their hands completely tied by their EU neighbours in terms of fiscal policy is an illusion. In this respect, the yardstick should not be whether the rules will place deficit sinners under strict curatorship in future, as this is unrealistic. Instead, it should be whether they are more effective than before in encouraging EU countries to reduce their mountains of debt. Some elements of the compromise could actually contribute to this, such as more realistic reduction paths, safety buffers for economic fluctuations or even lower sanctions, as draconian sanctions have never been applied in the past.

The fact that Italy, in particular, was prepared to agree to some of these "safety lines" at the urging of the North shows that there are apparently concerns in Rome about market turbulence and, thus, refinancing difficulties if the South had not moved at all. Against this backdrop, there is at least some hope that Europe's debtor countries are prepared to take seriously the rules that the Council has agreed on and which now have to be agreed with Parliament. Yes, this is less than a strict, rule-based control of national budgets. But it is at least more than no agreement at all. Because that would have been fatal, also for Germany.