“The cost of undershooting in monetary policy at the moment is still higher”
Ms Mester, the US economy is doing better than many expected, even though there have been a few weaker data recently. How do you assess the situation and outlook?
The big issue in the US economy has been high inflation for quite some time and continues to be so. We have made pretty good progress. Inflation rates have come down significantly from their peaks a year ago. But inflation is still way too high. Core inflation excluding energy and food is still more than 4%. Especially in services, inflation is sticky. So there is still a lot for us to do. We need to bring inflation down to our 2% target in a sustained and timely manner and we are determined to do that.
And what about economic activity?
Since the beginning of the summer, we have seen some data from the real economy that has been stronger than many forecasters expected. So the US economy is doing quite well. In my own forecast, I expect growth to slow to below trend growth. But so far we haven't really seen that in the numbers, even though a number of forward-looking indicators suggest that the slowdown will continue. What we need now is a slowdown in demand. Demand has to fall to come into line with supply. This is true both in product markets and in the labour market. This will help to further alleviate price pressures.
But so far supply and demand are not in balance?
We have made progress in dampening demand through our monetary policy measures. At the same time, there is progress on the supply side. Supply chain disruptions have improved. We are also seeing an improvement in the supply side of the labour market. More people are returning to the labour market. But we need further progress to bring supply and demand in line. And this then leads to the current crucial questions for monetary policy. Have we made monetary policy restrictive enough? And how long does monetary policy need to be restrictive to bring inflation back to 2%?
And what are your answers?
The latest indicators suggest that demand is somewhat stronger than expected, that the momentum in the economy is greater than thought. But if the underlying demand is stronger than expected, it needs a more restrictive policy. I can well imagine, from what I see so far, that we might have to go a bit higher, that we might have to raise the policy rate a bit more. But there is still a lot of time before our next decision in September and we will get a lot of data and information by then. It is also a question of weighing two risks. We don't want to tighten monetary policy too much and cause unnecessary pain to the economy. But we also don't want to tighten monetary policy too little. History has taught us that the cost of returning to price stability is even higher if we tighten too little. Given the strength of the labour market and the strength of underlying demand, I believe that currently the costs of insufficient tightening are greater.
The pain for the economy is not least about jobs. With the current unemployment rate at a very low 3.8%, is a return to the 2% inflation target possible or, with a view to wage growth, does this require a higher unemployment rate?
The labour market has also come more into balance. The number of job vacancies is decreasing and thus the ratio between job vacancies and unemployment rate is improving without a big increase in unemployment. We must now ensure that this positive development does not falter. My own forecast is for an increase in the unemployment rate. We do not have an accurate estimate for the so-called natural rate of unemployment. So one should not commit oneself to wanting to reach a certain level. But I assume that we see some increase in unemployment.
And how do you assess the recent development of wage growth? Are you still concerned that inflation expectations could de-anchor from the 2% target and that there will be a wage-price spiral?
Wage growth has moderated somewhat as the labour market has moderated. But we also know that current wage growth is higher than what is consistent with 2% inflation given productivity growth. As for expectations: medium and longer-term inflation expectations are fairly well anchored – even if they are at the upper end of the range that would be considered consistent with 2%. Short-term inflation expectations, of course, move more in line with current inflation. Now, for example, petrol prices are unfortunately rising again. We have to be very attentive to that. There is research, including from the Cleveland Fed, that you should not just focus on longer-term expectations. You also have to tackle short-term expectations that are too high and not be too complacent even when long-term inflation expectations are anchored. We need to make sure that our policy is restrictive enough to anchor inflation expectations firmly and bring inflation back down to our 2 percent target.
When you talk about the possibility of further interest rate hikes, are you only talking about one more step, as envisaged in the Fed's June projections, or can you also imagine more interest rate steps?
In the June projections we forecast, and I also forecast, two more rate hikes this year. We did one of them in July. At the September meeting we will have new projections and I cannot say yet what they will be. What I think is clear is that we want to bring inflation down to 2% and time is pressing. The longer inflation stays above 2%, the more likely it is that the risks will materialise. Inflation expectations can destabilise. And the investment decisions of companies and households will be distorted – with economic costs. In addition, the sooner we return to the 2% target, the better we will be able to deal with any new shock.
And for that it is then better to do too much than too little now in case of doubt?
We still have quite strong demand at the moment. And the same goes for the labour market. I think the cost of undershooting in monetary policy at the moment is still higher than the costs of overshooting. If we end up raising interest rates too much and the economy loses momentum more than necessary, we can lower interest rates. In the other case, if inflation picks up too much, the fight becomes much more difficult. Then we would have to end up raising interest rates even further. That would be much more costly.
And you are not too worried about a recession, right? Many observers predict a recession, especially given the lagged effect of monetary policy – in the second half of 2023 or 2024 at the latest.
Our aim is not to push the economy into recession. We also have the mandate of full employment. We just want our monetary policy to dampen demand sufficiently. We look closely at what is happening in the economy and we are data dependent. But we don't only look at the official data, we also have contacts with companies and banks. And this is interesting: at the end of last year, many of our contacts said they expected a recession at the beginning of this year. Then at the beginning of the year they said the middle of the year. And now many don't believe in a recession at all. This is simply because the economy has performed much better than expected. People have become more optimistic that there will be a soft landing.
Your colleague at the New York Fed, John Williams, recently caused quite a stir by saying that as inflation falls, real interest rates rise if the nominal rate is left unchanged, and that this could argue for interest rate cuts in 2024. What is your assessment of this?
Real interest rates determine the decisions of households and companies. And purely mathematically it is the case. But it is also clear that we will certainly not continue to raise interest rates until inflation has already fallen to 2%. Nor will we wait to lower interest rates until inflation is at 2%. We have to be forward looking. But I don't currently expect that we will cut interest rates early next year. Rather, I think we need to keep a sufficiently restrictive stance for quite some time to feel assured that inflation will come back down to 2%.
You mentioned the lessons of the past. You are certainly talking about the inflation era in the 1970s. Do you see the danger of a second wave of inflation if the Fed stops raising interest rates too early, as it did then, or even lowers the rate? Ex-US Treasury Secretary Larry Summers sees parallels and warns the Fed against giving in too soon.
We see certain prices going up again, like petrol prices. That can lead to higher measured inflation. There are other shocks that could occur. And there are upside risks to our inflation forecasts, in my view. So yes, inflation could go up again. So we have to make sure that our policy is sufficiently restrictive.
We have talked a lot about interest rates now. Another aspect is the reduction of the bloated Fed balance sheet, the Quantitative Tightening. Can this process continue even if the interest rate hikes are stopped or the key interest rate is even lowered again already?
I believe that the balance sheet reduction can and should continue in the background even if we stop raising the interest rate or even lower it. We need to systematically reduce our balance sheet and bring it back to an appropriate size that is consistent with sufficient reserves in the financial system.
What balance sheet size are you thinking of when you talk about an appropriate level?
We have not decided on a particular level at this point except that which is consistent with ample reserves and is lower than the current level. We saw in September 2019 that we probably went a bit too far at that time.
At that time there were market turbulences and liquidity shortages. But today the situation is different?
We are still very far from the balance sheet levels we had then and we have a much better apparatus today to monitor these kinds of tensions in the markets. So there is still plenty of room to reduce the balance sheet. And there again, we want to be better prepared for possible future shocks, in case we have to use our balance sheet.
What do you think is the most important lesson that central bankers should learn from the crises and experiences of the past years?
I think we need to look much more at scenarios instead of focusing so much on a base scenario. There is always a lot of uncertainty. There are different possibilities of how the economy can develop, not only in the case of a pandemic. We should consider these alternatives so that we are not just thinking about one path, but are prepared for the fact that things can always develop differently than expected.
Disclaimer: This interview has been edited and condensed for clarity.