„The transatlantic partnership is indispensable for Germany“
Mr McAllister, America has voted. What do the EU and Germany have to prepare for?
Eight years ago, the EU was surprised by Trump's election victory. This time, it's different: The Commission set up a working group months ago to prepare strategies for both election outcomes – a victory for Kamala Harris and a victory for Donald Trump.
We should not spend every day anxiously watching what President Trump says and does, but should get on with our own tasks regardless. It's about working together with the next US administration to find common interests.
The uncomfortable truth is that Washington's interest in the EU has steadily declined recently. Neither Mr Trump nor Ms Harris would have returned to the glorious transatlantic era of the early 1990s. Instead, President Biden will probably be the last US president with such strong personal ties to Europe.
So, how is Europe's role in the world changing?
Firstly, we need to take stock honestly: The transatlantic partnership is indispensable for Germany and Europe, and the connection to the USA is all the more crucial due to the tense geopolitical situation. Even if our interests do not always coincide, no other international partner is as close to us as the USA. Conversely, we remain essential for the USA because it cannot cope with global political upheavals on its own.
We must finally do our homework. That means more common foreign and security policy and strengthening our own defence readiness. We also need to promote our own economy, and not always strangle it with additional regulation. If we Europeans ourselves become stronger again, we will remain an interesting partner for the USA in the future.
We need to strengthen the European pillar within NATO and become an equal partner for the USA. We must remain transatlantic and at the same time become more European. Overall, we need more initiative and seriousness.
What priorities should Brussels set in order not to fall behind as an economic area?
The USA remains our most important trading partner. Together we account for around 29% of global trade. We need to further expand our bilateral relations through dialogue and consistent defence of our interests. The newly organised EU-US Trade and Technology Council (TTC) will serve this purpose in particular. At the same time, the aim must be to find mutually agreeable solutions to the measures that put a strain on our relationship. These include not only the US tariffs on steel and aluminium, but also the US Inflation Reduction Act. The tone will become harsher under a President Trump, but there are protectionist tendencies on both sides of the US political spectrum. This is another reason why it is so important that we as the EU conclude trade agreements with other countries and regions: Mercosur, Mexico, Australia, to name but a few.
Is Germany manoeuvring itself into a dead end under the current geopolitical changes with its focus on exports?
The threat made during the election campaign to impose blanket tariffs of 10% to 20% on EU products would hit Germany as an export nation particularly hard. The USA was Germany's most important trading partner in the first six months. Four years of Trump could cost companies around 180 billion euros, as calculated by the German Economic Institute (IW).
The concern that new tariffs could disrupt the flow of goods across the Atlantic is therefore not unjustified.
It is therefore in Germany's best interest that Berlin initiates constructive dialogue with the new administration in Washington with regard to our bilateral relations and at European level. However, the basic prerequisite is that a common government course can be agreed on.
What is your biggest concern with regard to the USA as a leading Western power?
Mr Trump's presidency from 2017 to 2021 offers very concrete indications of what we can expect in the coming years. His time in office has been characterised by capriciousness, numerous personnel changes and a discrepancy between what the president has said and what his administration has done.
It is likely that Mr Trump would surround himself exclusively with loyalists from the outset in the upcoming term of office. This could have a decisive impact on the course of the next four years, especially with regard to American support for Ukraine. A quick „deal“ promised by Donald Trump during the election campaign – if he were to surrender Ukraine's sovereignty and strengthen Russia – would be a disaster for Ukraine, and a severe strategic mistake with far-reaching consequences for Europe and the world. However, it remains to be seen how Mr Trump will ultimately orientate his Ukraine policy – because the biggest constant of his political approach has always been unpredictability. One thing is certain: Opponents and partners of the United States will probably have to reckon with transactional demands and solo efforts in the coming years.
