"All wheels stand still when your strong arm wills it." Perhaps no trade union fits this workers' anthem from 1863 as well as the German Train Drivers' Union, GdL. Last Thursday and Friday, its chairman, Claus Weselsky, was once again orchestrating a warning strike. The term "warning strike" is not symbolic; with an announced duration of 24 hours, it already deprives millions of people of their mobility and slows down production across the country. Weselsky's intention is not to seek a negotiated solution but to engage in a power struggle, as evident from the timeline: shortly after the start of negotiations, he declares them "failed," initiates a strike ballot, and announces the next warning strike. Millions of railway customers are taken hostage for the concerns of a small union of nearly 10,000 members. And why? Simply because GdL can enforce the blockade of the country without much of its own risk. The employer, the railway, will suffer losses, but the state will compensate for them, as the former state enterprise is practically a monopoly on this infrastructure. GdL members also do not need to worry about their jobs because the railway plays a central role in the federal government's climate strategy.

Given the recent surge in inflation and the resulting decrease in real wages, it is understandable that unions are approaching wage negotiations with more pressure than in previous rounds. Employers are also more reserved during these times of cost increases. In 2023, there have already been so many strikes that one must look back to the 1990s to find a comparable intensity. However, companies must also accept that the tide has turned from an "employer's market," where they can choose employees, to an "employee's market". The shortage of skilled workers is just one manifestation. Many double-digit wage increases have already been agreed upon.

Nevertheless, there is a significant difference in whether the strikers bear their own risk with a work stoppage or not. If they do, it has a calming effect on wage negotiations because no one wants to jeopardize their own job. But in most state-owned enterprises and nationwide or regional infrastructure monopolies, this is not the case: they are quasi-monopolies and are protected by the public sector. Therefore, there is a difference between, for example, striking metal companies where jobs may be lost due to prolonged production stoppages, and striking public health services or an entire rail network, where there is no competition or alternative options. Hence, the question arises whether the legislator should tolerate this spectacle any longer?

Berlin aimed to suppress union competition in companies with the Tarifeinheitsgesetz (Collective Agreements Unity Act), which has only partially succeeded. This is evident in strikes by train drivers, pilots, doctors, etc. However, the constitutional judges have granted the legislature the authority to ensure a balance between the interests of all workers. With the principles of proportionality and the prohibition of undermining the common good with labor disputes, there are already guidelines. In 1991, the Federal Constitutional Court ruled that restrictions on the constitutionally protected right to strike are possible if fundamental rights of third parties and other constitutional goods are affected.

Doctors, for example, take this into consideration, which is not necessarily the case for train drivers who want to expand their mini-union. Here, it is simply about recruiting additional members and poaching members from the much larger Railway and Transport Workers' Union (EVG) to undermine the Collective Agreements Unity Act. The threatened GdL mega-strike in early 2024 will show whether the legislature needs to take action.