The German Stock Corporation Act forms the binding framework for effective corporate governance and monitoring in the stock corporation – and therefore for the Supervisory Board and Management Board. It enshrines the principle of checks and balances in the dualistic governance model, taking into account corporate co-determination. As long as this model is adhered to, I do not believe that fundamental changes to the law are necessary. The Supervisory Board's room for manoeuvre is large enough to react to new requirements and to fulfil a modern understanding of its role.

If an amendment to the German Stock Corporation Act were nevertheless to be considered, it would at best make sense to sharpen the role of the chairman of the supervisory board.

In my opinion: Yes! The German Stock Corporation Act lays down the statutory minimum for supervisory board meetings, regular management board reports, committees and responsibilities – with a clear legislative focus on control tasks. The role of the supervisory board as a strategic sparring partner established today, on the other hand – which was originally triggered by case law – is largely characterised by the recommendations of the German Corporate Governance Code and the Commission's current practical guidelines.

Correct, because one-size-fits-all solutions are just as unsuitable as the supervisory board's „scope for intervention“to strengthen its strategic role. In contrast to monitoring and control, advice cannot be enforced – it requires not only an advisor, but also a management board that accepts the advice. A statutory regulation would be ineffective here.

Operational intervention options only help the Supervisory Board to a limited extent beyond the transactions already determined by it and requiring approval. Rather, it is crucial that the Supervisory Board is involved closely enough in the strategic considerations of the Management Board at an early stage and can actively participate in the discussion. The right of initiative and responsibility for the strategy remain clearly with the Management Board.

The question is not whether the Supervisory Board exerts influence, but how it can contribute its input most effectively. The prerequisite is that the members of the Supervisory Board, with their diverse internal and external perspectives, insights and targeted questions, encourage the Management Board to critically scrutinise its considerations. It is precisely this requirement – which a management board has every right to expect from its supervisory board – that presents the board with the greatest challenge. In my opinion, this is more demanding than the mere monitoring of strategy implementation by the Management Board.

Here, too, I think, in principle yes. No supervisory board is currently prevented from holding discussions with investors via its chairman – at least on topics that are its primary responsibility, such as the composition of the supervisory board and executive board or their remuneration. The Code provides a clear suggestion in this regard – the result of an initiative by supervisory board chairmen and investors in 2016, which explicitly formulates guidelines for such a dialogue.

Legal experts sometimes criticise the legally uncertain distinction between the Executive Board and Supervisory Board in discussions with investors, particularly when it comes to strategic issues. However, in corporate practice, every supervisory board chairman is aware of their role. There have long been pragmatic solutions – for example by involving Investor Relations – to deal with this issue in a targeted manner.

Because of the international nature of our shareholder base and the global economic activities of many companies based in Germany, there is not enough international representation on supervisory boards beyond the DACH region – and this is detrimental to companies.

The dualistic model with employee participation is often used as an explanation. Yes, at first glance it may seem strange: a lot of formalism, less proximity to operational activities, potential between the two levels. All of this does not exactly promote a trusting, open working atmosphere in which every member can actively contribute. But the real key lies in the leadership of the Supervisory Board – in other words, the Chairman.

It is not appropriate for supervisory board members to complain about their remuneration. However, indeed, German supervisory boards are not at the top of the remuneration tables in an international comparison. If we want to attract more international expertise to our boards, we should also openly discuss in the supervisory board community whether the current remuneration structure still does justice to a modern interpretation of supervisory board work and the associated time commitment.

As a board, a supervisory board must be able to understand the normal course of business and the market environment. As this varies from company to company, it is difficult to generalise which topics – such as M&A transactions as so-called special situations – necessarily require external advice. Shouldn't this expertise be expected directly on the supervisory board of an investment holding company with active portfolio management, for example?

I think the discussion about generalists versus specialists is misguided. Every member must be able to understand the Management Board reports – including on topics such as sustainability or Management Board remuneration. But not everyone has to be an expert in everything. This is where the team concept, which is also the basis of the German Stock Corporation Act, comes into play: An experienced supervisory board chairman knows the strengths of each member – regardless of the usual qualification matrix – and knows who the board can turn to when specific issues arise.