At least one person might be in a celebratory mood. Hungary's Prime Minister Viktor Orbán famously wanted to pop open a bottle of bubbly if Donald Trump won the US presidential election. He was able to do so surprisingly early, as the election turned out much more clearly in Trump's favour than many observers had expected. No other European leader had been as open as the Hungarian in declaring himself a Trump supporter before the election. With the Republican's return to the White House, however, this is changing. Italy's Prime Minister Georgia Meloni has stated that she is convinced that the strategic connection between the USA and the fraternal nation of Italy will be strengthened even further with Trump.

EU diplomats and EU officials have recently endeavoured to convey the message that the European Union is much better prepared this time for a Trump election victory than it was in November 2016. This is true insofar as the EU Commission, for example, has been preparing detailed trade policy responses in confidential committees for some time, in order to be able to threaten concrete countermeasures if Trump follows through on his threats of import tariffs. And yes, it was far-sighted to push ahead with the support package for Ukraine before the election, so that there would at least be no acute shortage of aid.

Nevertheless, the claim that the EU is better prepared this time is only half the truth. Europe has become even more economically dependent on the United States. Transatlantic trade in goods has doubled within a decade. The USA – on a par with China– is the EU's most important trading partner. Economists have done a lot of maths: Import tariffs or other barriers to transatlantic trade in goods would hit the US hard. But the EU would be hit even harder.

From a trade policy perspective, a President Kamala Harris might also have posed major problems for the EU. Nevertheless, Trump's election victory puts the EU under far greater stress. This is because the EU's main political denominator – at least according to the EU Commission, a majority in the EU Parliament and most national governments – is based on three convictions in particular. That the internal market is beneficial and should therefore be intensified. That climate change is an existential threat, and that the EU should therefore be a pioneer in decarbonising the economy. And that the aggressor Russia has invaded Ukraine and that Kiev can therefore count on continued support.

The EU must now prepare itself for disruptive fire from the White House on all three points. Be it because there is a serious risk that Trump will try to drive the 27 EU states apart – especially as he sees the EU less as a partner than as an adversary. Be it because Trump could withdraw from the Paris Climate Agreement for a second time, and thus complicate efforts to find global answers to the climate crisis. Or because he could use pressure to pursue a „peace plan“ that would be perceived as a capitulation in Ukraine.

What's more, the EU would come under additional economic stress if Trump were to impose draconian surcharges on imports from China to the USA. This is because the People's Republic would then push its products onto the European market even more aggressively.

And ultimately, the EU must fear that the tone of Trump's behaviour, and his contempt for democratic institutions, will also boost those political forces in Europe that will ensure that the EU finds itself in an ongoing stress test over the next few years. Some people are hoping that Trump's re-election will bring Europe's governments closer together so that they can join forces to counter him. But this is likely to be wishful thinking. Much more concrete is the risk that Eurosceptic parties will use the US election result as a tailwind and the political centrifugal forces from the European Union will become stronger.